Collateral Damage in Humanitarian Interventions

Although I discount the Libyan government’s assertions that many civilians have already been killed as a result of Operation Odyssey Dawn, it is inevitable that Libyan civilians will be killed by bombs dropped by Western planes or missiles launched from Western ships. Are such deaths excusable in an action the goal of which is to protect civilians, or do they render the action perverse?

Congressional Approval Required?

Over on Slate.com, Weigel argues that Barack Obama needn’t have sought congressional approval for the military intervention in Libya because the Congress (or some of its leadership, minus Kucinich) doesn’t mind the fact that he didn’t seek their consultation and approval.

My expertise in law and international law is limited (I’m not a lawyer), but from the cases I’ve studied, it seems to me that this argument holds a grain of truth. The Supreme Court has at times found that where the Congress abdicates its power to the executive relative to foreign policy, the president can exercise that power. So basically as long as the Congress doesn’t mind, it’s OK. Plus the War Powers Act stipulates only that the president notify Congress of military action within 48 hours of the commencement of that action, which Obama did.

That said, I wish Obama had consulted with and sought congressional approval before intervening in Libya. This could have been as simple as asking Congress to give him permission to take all necessary action to execute UN resolutions relevant to the Libyan situation.  But he didn’t, and this is now very much Obama’s war, and his alone.

Referees of Civil War

Very quickly, I’d like to bring up, in the context of America’s soon to be intervention in Libya, the fact that we still don’t know what we would be fighting for save the broad ideal of democracy. Barack Obama drew a line in the sand, saying that our goal would not extend beyond the protection of civilians, but are the U.S. and its allies then acting as referees in a game of civil war? And if they are, are they going to be impartial?

Of course not. Quaddafi must go; he is persona non grata throughout most of the world. How, then, does mission creep not occur if the rebels are on the verge of losing?

Humanitarian Intervention is Back

With the international community authorized to use force to protect civilians in Yemen, the West is once again trying out humanitarian intervention. Andrew Sullivan is critical of this latest venture, and has criticized Barack Obama for not fully enunciating a rationale for using force in Libya. He asks pointedly, why are we getting involved in Libya and not in Yemen, Bahrain, or elsewhere? My first reaction to this was to imagine that a different sort of “mission creep” might occur when and if military action is used against Libya. Might the moral rationale used by Obama draw us deeper into the unrest occurring elsewhere in the Middle East? Could this be the beginning of a more forceful U.S. foreign policy in that area?

Generally speaking, though, Sullivan’s critique echoes critiques of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy that I have heard in school and in the media. Basically, Clinton was said to have a patchwork foreign policy that involved intervening in some states, but not others. The obvious example is Rwanda, the memory of which many suspect might be driving the Obama administrations decision today. But it seems to me that U.S. policy has long been that we will intervene when our moral and strategic interests coincide with one another. Moreover, most presidents’ foreign policies have notable exceptions. George W. Bush, for example, pushed for democracy in the Middle East, but gave legitimacy to Muammar Quaddafi when he gave up his nuclear ambitions. Still, Obama has not stated what our national interest is in Libya?

Liberate Libya? At What Cost?

Underreported in the Libyan crisis is a characteristic of the thawar, or revolutionaries, that puts human rights advocates — along with advocates of intervention — in something of a bind: the minimum age for the thawar draft is only only 15. Hard numbers are difficult to come by, but regardless of the percentage of the rebel army that is under the age of 18, any international intervention would be aiding a force that conscripts child soldiers.

Aiding pro-democracy forces is an admirable idea, but how to we reconcile the fact that such support implicitly supports the use of child soldiers? I suppose that imposing a no-fly zone would be the least detestable option. But how much of a difference would that actually make if the rebel forces remain poorly-trained and poorly-armed. During the conflict in Bosnia, the no-fly zone and arms ban imposed by NATO kept the Bosnian military from securing adequate weapons with which to fight Serbian forces. The same could be expected to occur in Libya. But if the West were to arm the Libyan rebels, they would literally be placing guns in the hands of child soldiers.